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Issue No. 4:

Did the trial court error in requiring the

defendant to pay $5,000.00 toward the plaintiff's attorney's
fees when the evidence before the court reflected that he did
not have the ability nor financial means to allow him to make
such an attorney's fees payment?
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the requests made by the wife relative to custody, child support,
alimony

and

property

distribution

as being

unreasonable

and

requesting that certain premarital property and gifts from his
parents be restored to him should a divorce be granted.
This appeal involves the trial court's award of alimony, the
trial court's failure to award to the husbaand what was left of
his premarital property, the trial court's inclusion in the marital
estate of specific gifts made to the husband only by his parents
and the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife.
The case was tried before the Honorable John A. Rokich on
January 12, 13, 17 & 18 and February 7, 1989.

The Court received

certain stipulations of the parties, testimony and documentary
evidence.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the

matter under advisement and on March 6, 1989, issued a Memorandum
Decision.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of

Divorce were prepared by the wife's counsel and objections to the
same were filed by the husband's trial counsel.
were argued to the trial court on April

Those objections

18, 1989.

Certain

modifications in the proposed Findings were made and on April 26,
1989, and final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce were signed and entered on April 26, 1989 (copies of the
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce have been included in the Addendum to this
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3.

For an Order modifying the property distribution so that

he is given credit for the substantial cash gifts and advances on
his inheritance given to him by his parents during the marriage.
4.

For an Order reversing and vacating the trial court's

award of attorney's fees to the wife.
5.

For an order awarding him his costs on Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marital History

The parties were married on June 27, 1981, (R. 2).
separated in approximately March of 1988 (R. 9) .

They

At the time of

trial, the wife, Elizabeth was 3 0 years old and the husband, David
was 36.

During the marriage, they had three children, ages 3, 4

& 6, respectively (Tr. 7) .

Neither had been married before and

neither had any other support obligations.

Elizabeth had secured

a bachelors of science degree in business administration and had
completed

44

hours

toward

a masters

of

divinity

degree

at

Southwestern Theological Seminary in Ft. Worth, Texas (Tr. 8) .
David had received a bachelors degree in business at the University
of Tennessee and a masters degree of divinity at Southwestern
Theological Seminary in Ft. Worth, Texas (Tr. 53).
Elizabeth brought nothing into the marriage, however, prior
to the marriage, David had received a cash gift from his parents
in the amount of $37,500.00 cash which he had placed in a Merrill
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Lynch Ready Asset Account also established prior to the marriage
(Tr. 629). At the time of the marriage, David's parents gave the
parties $8,000.00 cash as a wedding gift (Tr. 761). The parties,
because of religious convictions, agreed to take $5,000.00 of that
sum and contribute it as a tithe

(Tr. 761) .

The remaining

$3,000.00 was evidently used for family expenses during the first
few years of the marriage and was deposited into David's Ready
Asset Account.

In August of 1985, the parties moved to Salt

Lake City, where David began to work part-time for the Granite
School District Transportation Department as a bus driver. He also
acquired a part-time job with the State of Utah as a Protestant
Chaplain at the Utah State Prison (Tr. 613).
After moving to Salt Lake City, the parties decided to
purchase a home which continued to be the marital residence up
through the time of trial.

The home was purchased for $55,411.80

(R. 86) . At trial, it was agreed that the fair market value of the
home according to the most recent tax assessment was $54,850.00
(Tr. 634) and at that time, there was an outstanding balance owed
on the first trust deed of $26,161.32 (Tr. 635).

The home was

purchased as a result of a $20,000.00 cash gift given to David in
the form of a check and a $7,000.00 loan also given in the form of
a check both of which were from David's parent's (Tr. 713). The
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$20,000.00 was considered by David to be an advance towards his
inheritance (Tr. 713). In addition, in 1987 the parties purchased
a Blazer automobile for $21,166.29 (Tr. 626). In connection with
that purchase, they traded in a car previously given to them from
David's parents.
20D & 21D).

It had a trade-in value of $3,635.3 6 (Exhibits

David's parents then gave David a check for $13,500.00

which represented the cash down payment on that automobile (Tr.
626, 627, 628).

The remaining $4,900.00 was financed and the

parties, at the time of trial, were paying that obligation off at
the rate of $99.00 per month (R. 85).
The $20,000.00 inheritance and the $13,500.00 down payment on
the automobile were gifts from David's parents to David (Tr. 62 8,
636).

David's parents intended those gifts for David only, not

Elizabeth (R. 13-17).
While in Salt Lake, the parties decided to establish a
ministry within their home and began to build a small congregation.
In order to assist the parties in this venture, each of the
parties' parents began contributing monthly sums to the ministry.
Elizabeth's parents gave approximately $350.00 per month (Tr. 52)
and David's parents gave approximately $150.00 per month and in
addition, contributed

approximately

$1,000.00 per year toward

purchase of the children's clothing. The monthly contributions of
the parties' parents went to the operation of the ministry to cover
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expenses related to serving the congregation and maintaining the
ministry (Tr. 52-53, 744). Evidently, both sets of parents were
claiming such monthly contributions as charitable contributions for
tax purposes (Tr. 743).
Elizabeth stated that prior to trial she had been employed
with Transamerica Telemarketing and worked about 3 0 hours per week.
She indicated that during that time she had broken the office
record in sales, but she had recently terminated that employment
by her own choice on the grounds that she "had burned out" after
three months on the job (Tr. 47). At the time of trial, Elizabeth
was employed at Fred Meyer working 25-3 0 hours per week with a
gross income of $450.00 per month ($4.10 per hour) (Tr. 48). She
also admitted that she knew how to type, run computers, and had
secretarial skills (Tr. 50) and following to trial, but prior to
the trial court's entry of its Memorandum Decision, the court was
advised that Elizabeth had obtained full-time employment as a
receptionist with a local law firm at the rate of $6.00 per hour
or $960.00 per month (R. 141).
At the time of trial, David had been employed in his jobs with
the Granite School District and the State of Utah for three and
one-half years (Tr. 613).

His gross income from his chaplain

services at the prison was approximately $700.00 per month and his
gross income from the Granite School District was approximately
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$860.00 per month; resulting in a total monthly gross income of
$1,567.00 per month (Tr. 613).

In addition, he had historically

earned approximately $2,000.00 per year ($166.67 per month) as a
directors fee from his father's company.

He was working 49 hours

per week in connection with the two jobs (Tr. 73 2) and after
including the $166.67 per month described above, David netted after
taxes approximately $1,400.00 (Tr. 616 and Exhibit 18-D). In 1988,
his total gross income was $20,965.00 (Tr. 728).
During the marriage, David kept his premarital Merrill Lynch
Ready Asset Account separate and at no time placed Elizabeth's name
on the account, nor at any time did she have access to it.
only funds which were deposited

The

into the account during the

marriage was the remaining $3,000.00 of the $8,000.00 wedding gift
given the parties by David's parents (Tr. 741, 762). The Merrill
Lynch Ready Asset Account was not changed,

altered

and was

continuously maintained by David from prior to the marriage to the
date of trial.

During the marriage, David elected to open an IRA

account in his name and on occasion would withdraw funds from the
Ready Asset Account to make an annual IRA contribution for him.
At the time of trial, there was $1,994.59 remaining in the Merrill
Lynch Ready Asset Account (Tr. 629) and $13,069.77 in David's IRA
account (Tr. 799-800).

Elizabeth admitted that $37,500.00 of the

funds originally in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account were

8

David's premarital property (Tr. 820).
After separation, Elizabeth obtained a temporary restraining
order against David (R. 7) which ultimately resulted in a temporary
order requiring David to vacate the marital residence and to pay
to Elizabeth $100.00 per month, per child in child support and the
$354.00 per month house payment (R. 46-49).

Thereafter, numerous

motions on temporary issues were filed, argued and ruled upon by
the Domestic Relations Commissioner and/or the trial court.

The

case was ultimately tried before Judge Rokich on January 12, 13,
17, 18 and February 7, 1989.
Trial Proceedings
The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the
fact that each party strenuously asseted their rights to custody
over their children. Substantial portions of the record deal with
that custody issue. At the conclusion of what appears to be a very
unorthodox and disjointed trial proceeding, the trial court filed
a Memorandum Decision which in relevant part provided as follows:
1.
to

It awarded custody of the parties1 three minor children

Elizabeth

subject

to

substantially

enlarged

and

liberal

visitation and parental access for David (R. 178-180);
2.

It awarded Elizabeth the use and possession of the

marital residence subject to a lien in David's favor of $13,900
(one-half of the present net equity without considering
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the

$27,000,00 contributed toward the purchase price by David's parents
(R. 181);
3.

It awarded David the 1987 Blazer automobile subject to

him paying Elizabeth $6,500.00 representing one-half of the equity
in that vehicle again without considering the $13,500.00 gift to
David from his parents (R. 181);
4.

It directed David to pay child support in accordance with

child support guidelines without finding incomes, imputing income
or ordering an exact amount by way of child support (R. 182); (The
figure of $354.00 per month later found its way into the Findings
(R. 254).
5.

It awarded Elizabeth the Decree of Divorce (R. 182);

6.

It awarded Elizabeth $2 50.00 per month permanent alimony

from David without making a finding as to Elizabeth's ability to
support herself;
7.

It required David to pay $5,000.00 toward Elizabeth's

attorney's fees (R. 182);
8.

It then directed Elizabeth's counsel to prepare findings

consistent with the Memorandum Decision (R. 182).
Thereafter, proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree

of

Divorce

were

prepared

and

David's

counsel

filed

objections to the same (R. 186-193) . The objections of David were
presented to the Court at a hearing on April 18, 1989 (R. 856-876) .
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Subsequent to that hearing, certain modifications were made in the
Findings, Conclusions and Decree and final Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed on April 26,
1989 (R. 260, 261).
On May 24, 1989, David filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R.
325).

Elizabeth did not file a Cross-Appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony to the

Elizabeth.

The evidence presented to the trial court reflected a

relatively short marriage, a young husband and wife, healthy, with
approximately equal education and equal earning capacities had not
the wife voluntarily underemployed herself.
alimony was inappropriate.

As such, an award of

In making this award, the trial court

erroneously attempted to maintain the wife's standard of living
without considering that the alimony award would have the effect
of greatly reducing the husband's standard of living when both
claimed approximately the same amount of monthly expenses.

In

addition, the trial court's Findings relative to the alimony award
were fatally defective in that they did not address the wife's
ability to support herself or provide the necessary financial facts
to support the alimony award.

The alimony award should be vacated

in its entirety.
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POINT II
Prior to the marriage, David had $37,500.00 in Merrill Lynch
Ready Asset Account in his sole name representing a gift to him
from his parents prior to the marriage.

That account was kept

separate during the entire marriage and Elizabeth was given no
interest in or access to the same.

During the marriage, David

withdrew certain sums annually to contribute to an IRA in his name.
The record contains no evidence as to how the remaining funds were
used, but at the time of trial there was only $1,994.59 left in the
Ready Asset Account and $13,069.77 in the IRA account. Throughout
the marriage, these funds were kept separate and distinct from
marital funds and Elizabeth had no control whatsoever over the
same.

The trial court erroneously concluded that both of these

accounts were marital property and divided them equally between
the parties.

To do so was contrary to the holdings of Mortensen

v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) and Jesperson v. Jesperson,
610 P. 2d 326 (Utah 1980) which stand for the proposition that
separate, gifted or inherited property should be returned to the
party who received such property.

In so doing, the trial court

created marital property where marital property did not exist and
arrived

at

an

unfair

and

inequitable

property

distribution

unjustifiably in favor of Elizabeth and unjustifiably unfair to
David.

The trial court's property distribution should be vacated
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as it relates to the IRA and Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Accounts
and those should be awarded to David as his sole and separate
premarital property.
POINT III
During the course of the marriage, David's parents gave David
$20,000,00 as an advance on his inheritance which he used as part
of the down payment on the marital residence, and loaned him an
additional $7,000.00 which he likewise used as a part of the down
payment.

They also gave him $13,500.00 case to purchase a car

consistent with the practices they had engaged in with the rest of
their

children.

The

evidence presented

to the trial court

reflected that these were gifts to David only and not David and
Elizabeth jointly.

In spite of this evidence, the trail court

erroneously chose to ignore the gifts and give David no credit for
the same.

In addition, the trial court found that the $7,000.00

loan

David's

from

parents was

disregarded it entirely.

only

a moral

obligation

and

In so doing, the trial court again

ignored the evidence before it and did not follow the rule laid
down in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), that
portion of the Decree that gives David no credit for the gifts he
received from his parents should be vacated and the matter remanded
with instructions to the trial court to increase David's lien in
the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts.
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POINT IV
Under Utah law, the party requesting an award of attorney's
fees

has

the

burden

of

proving

three

elements:

(1)

the

reasonableness of the fee; (2) the need of that party to have his
or her fee paid or contributed to; and (3) the ability of the party
from whom the fee is being requested to contribute to or pay an
attorney's fee award.

In this case, while the first two elements

may have been present in terms of evidence in the record, the third
was not satisfied.

The trial court erroneously required David to

contribute $5,000.00 toward Elizabeth's attorney's fees when David
had not the income nor the property to look to in order to satisfy
such a fee award. As such, the trial court's attorney's fee award
of $5,000.00 should be reversed and vacated in its entirety with
an order requiring each party to bear their own fees and costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARDED OF ALIMONY
TO THE WIFE IN TERMS OF AMOUNT AND DURATION
WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CHILD
SUPPORT ORDERED AND THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE
INCOMES AND ABILITIES TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES

14

lb.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EQUALIZE THE
STANDARD OF LIVING OF BOTH PARTIES IN
MAKING ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY
This is a case in which the trial court should not have
awarded the alimony it did. The facts as reflected by the evidence
did not justify the award.
This was a seven and one-half year marriage (R. 2). At the
time of trial, Elizabeth was 3 0 years old and David was 3 6 (Tr. 7) .
Both had bachelors degrees in business administration (Tr. 8, 53)
and while David had a Masters in divinity (Tr. 53), Elizabeth had
44 hours towards her Masters in divinity (Tr. 8). There was no
evidence that either was not in good health.

Elizabeth had good

and proficient secretarial and computer skills as well as her
education and training in business (Tr. 50) . In spite of this, at
the time of trial, she voluntarily chose to work part-time at Fred
Meyer as a clerk 25-30 hours per week at $4.10 per hour which
equated

to

$450.00

per

month

gross

(Tr.

50).

Just

after

separation, she had had a job at Transamerica Telemarketing as a
sales representative (Tr. 47) . She held the job at for about three
months during which time she broke the office record in sales (Tr.
47).

She then, however, voluntarily terminated that job to take

the clerking job at Fred Meyer because she said she was "burned
out" (Tr. 47) .

This change of jobs and reduction in work time
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occurred while this action was pending.

After trial, but before

the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, the court was
advised by letter from Elizabeth's counsel that she had obtained
a full-time job as a receptionist and was earning $960.00 gross per
month (R. 141).
David on the other hand was working two jobs (Tr. 59) and
putting in 49 hours per week (Tr. 734).

He grossed $700.00 per

month from his chaplain's job at the state prison and $860.00 per
month driving school buses.

In addition, he earned $166.00 per

month as a director's fee from his father's company (Tr. 614).
Elizabeth testified he had not had any offers to work as a fulltime minister during the marriage (Tr. 60) .
Elizabeth testified she had expenses of $2,100.00 per month
as reflected on an earlier Financial Declaration, but which was
never received into evidence (Tr. 63) (See Exhibit list, Addendum
to this Brief) .

In rebutting that testimony, David had gone

through the total family expenditures for 198 7 and calculated that
while living together they

were spending approximately $1,100.00

per month (Tr. 644, 646 and Ex. 3D & 24D) .

David, on the other

hand, testified from his Financial Declaration which was admitted
into evidence that his monthly expenses including a $3 00.00 per
month child support award were $1,801.33 (Tr. 619, R. 86, Ex. 18D).
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With this evidence before it, the trial court ordered that
David pay the following monthly payments:
1.

$250.00 per month in permanent alimony (R. 260)

2.

$354.00 per month in child support (R. 265)

3.

$211.25 per month in child care (R. 266)

Total

$815.25

In making an award of alimony, trial courts in Utah are duty
bound to consider the financial condition and needs of the spouse
requesting

alimony,

the

ability

of

that

spouse

to

produce

sufficient income for herself or himself and the ability of the
paying spouse to provide support to the requesting spouse. (Olson
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d
276 (Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones 700 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Canning
v. Canning, 744 P.2d

325

(Utah App. 1987); and Schindler v.

Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).
Once the court has considered the evidence related to these
criteria, it must then attempt to adjust the parties1 finances to
arrive at support figures which achieve as closely as possible an
equalization of the standards of living of both parties and then
as a secondary consideration, attempt to maintain each of them at
a level as close as possible to the standard of living they enjoyed
while married.
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As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson, 704
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985):
An alimony award should, as far as
possible, equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them at a
level as close as possible to the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage.
Id. at 566 [Emphasis added]
See also Higlev v. Higlev. 676, Pe2d 379 (Utah 1983).
In the present case, the trial court erred by not considering
the substantial decrease in David's standard of living which
accured by virtue of the overall support award vis a vis the total
income of the parties as the following clearly reflects:

Net Monthly Income
Child support
Alimony
Child Care
Contribution
Disposable Income

David

Elizabeth

$1,^0.00

$ 787.00

$

(354.00)
(250.00)

354.00
250.00

(211.25)
584.75

211.25
$1,602.25

$960 gross less
est. 18% taxes

This substantial difference in disposable income becomes even
more inequitable when considered in conjunction with the liberal
visitation schedule which the trial court awarded David.

Under

that schedule, David will have the children almost as much as
Elizabeth and will have many of the same expenses related to them
that she has but will have no monies to meet those expenses.
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Therefore, the only way to achieve an equitable allocation of
income between the parties is to eliminate the alimony award so
that each party can at least have similar standards of living.
Even in so doing, there will still be a disparity in disposable
income, but under the circumstances of this case, perhaps such a
disparity is unavoidable.
As was stated in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979):
The purpose of alimony is to provide post
marital support; it is intended neither as a
penalty to be imposed on the husband nor as a
reward granted to the wife.
Id. at 147.
The facts of this case including the ages and health of the
parties, the relatively short term of the marriage, the parity of
education between the parties, their respective incomes after
considering his child support obligations, their similar earning
capacities and Elizabeth's voluntary underemployment demonstrate
that this was not a case where an alimony award, let alone a
permanent alimony award, was appropriate.

The award should be

vacated in its entirety.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY ARE
INADEQUATE
A trial court's decision will be overturned if its Findings
of Fact are not sufficiently detailed as to all factors contained
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in the statue for determination of support to be paid in divorce
actions. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P. 2d 909, 911 (Utah App. 1988).
As was held in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P. 2d 121
(Utah App. 1988):
Moreover, it is reversible error if a
trial court fails to make findings on all
material issues unless the facts in the record
are "'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.1" Acton v. Deliran, 7373 P.2d 996
(Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660
P.2d 233 (Utah 1983)).
Utah courts have consistently found an
abuse of discretion in setting alimony when the
trail court failed to make findings on the
financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse. See e.g., Hialey v. Higley, 676 P.2d
379, 382 (Utah 1983) (remanded since the trial
court made no findings with regard to the
receiving spouse's ability to work); Ruhsam v.
Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 12, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(trial court failed to adequately address the
financial needs of the claimant spouse, making
it necessary for the reviewing court to remand
the issue for further findings).
Id. 124
In this case, the trial court's Memorandum Decision fails to
recite any financial data whatsoever in support of its statements.
. The defendant shall pay child
support in accordance with the child support
guidelines . . .
The defendant shall pay $250.00 as alimony
to the plaintiff.
(R. 182)
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Thereafter,

Elizabeth

submitted

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law which were ultimately signed by the trial court
after minor modifications; even those inadequately addressed the
required elements.

The trial court found in pertinent part as

follows:
17.
The plaintiff was not employed
outside the home during the marriage.
The
plaintiff was not employed outside the home at
the time of the divorce.
She obtained
employment as a receptionist prior to the
ruling entered herein.
She is now earning
$960.00 a month, gross. (R. 253)
26.
Based on the standard of living
enjoyed by the parties during their marriage,
the incomes of the parties, the needs of the
plaintiff, and the defendant's ability to pay,
it is reasonable, just, and equitable that the
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in
the amount of $250.00 a month. Said alimony
shall
terminate
upon
the
plaintiff's
remarriage, cohabitation with a member of the
opposite sex, or death (R. 254, 255).
Conspicuously absent from these Findings is the required
element of plaintiff's ability to provide support for herself and
the absolutely critical underlying financial information relative
to the living expenses of each of the parties. The absence of this
information in the Findings make any award of alimony fatally
defective and consequently this Court should reverse and vacate
the alimony award.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE
DEFENDANT WHAT WAS LEFT OF HIS PREMARITAL
PROPERTY
The law in Utah is now clear that pre-marital property and/or
its proceeds should be awarded the to the party who brought the
property into the marriage.

In the recent case of Mortensen v.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), Justice Howe reaffirmed the
principles related to premarital property in divorce actions and
stated:
. . . In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705,
(Utah 1982), we affirmed a divorce decree
awarding to each party in general the real and
personal property he or she brought into the
marriage or inherited during the marriage^ We
there said:
following the principle we have approved
in cases like Georgedes v. Georgedes, Utah
627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); and
Humphrey v. Humphreys, Utah 520 P.2d 193
(197 4), the district court concluded that
each party should in general receive the
real and personal property he or she
brought to the marriage or inherited
during the marriage.
Id. at 306 [Emphasis added]
In the case of Jesperson v. Jesperson, our Supreme Court also
upheld the trial court's division of the property on the same
basis.

The trial court found that the defendant brought no assets

into the six-year marriage.

The plaintiff on the other hand,

22

brought into the marriage a number of assets including $22,500.00
in savings. The Supreme Court's affirmation of the Decree stated:
It was not unreasonable for the court to permit
the plaintiff to withdraw from the marital
property the equivalent of those assets
plaintiff brought into the marriage.
Id. at 328 [Emphasis added]
In this case, there are no circumstances allowing deviation
from the general rule.

In fact, the circumstances of this case

require an application of the Mortensen rule.
It is undisputed and was acknowledged by Elizabeth and her
counsel that David came into the marriage with the Merrill Lynch
Ready

Asset

Account

in his

name with

a

$37,500.00

representing gifts he received from his family.

balance

That account

continued to remain in his own name and with the same institution
throughout the marriage. At no time did Elizabeth have control of,
access to, or any interest in that account.

When the parties

married, $3,000.00 of the $8,000.00 wedding gift from David's
parents went into the account. At the time of tiral, this account
had $1,999.59 in it.
The evidence was also undisputed that during this relatively
short marriage, David would on occasion withdraw funds from the
Ready Asset Account and deposit them into an IRA for his benefit
which fund had $13,000.00 in it at the time of trial.

These

transactions in no way changed the character or source of the
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money, but only the vehicle in which the money was held.
In sum, these monies which started out to be $4 0,500.00 before
and at the time of the marriage resulted in two accounts totalling
approximately $15,000.00 which the trial court then arbitrarily and
without sufficient evidence elected to divide in half resulting in
$7,500.00 going to David when seven years ago he had started out
with $40,500.00 or a net $33,000.00 loss to him from funds given
to him by his family.
In dividing the funds remaining in his IRA and Ready Asset
Account equally between the parties, the trial court ignored the
law set out in Mortensen, Jesperson, Humphreys and Georqedes,
supra. when it had no factual or legal basis to do so.

Most

likely, the trial court incorrectly analyzed the parties1 economic
situation and concluded that since the parties had acquired very
little by way of marital assets, the best thing to do was to divide
David's separate, premarital, gifted, property equally.

If any

event the trial court did not follow the Law as it relates to
awarding separate pre-marital property to the person bringing it
into the marriage and consequently, that portion of the Decree
relating to the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account and David's IRA
should be vacated and those two assets should be awarded to David
in their entirety.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING SPECIFIC
GIFTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTS TO THE
DEFENDANT AS A PART OF THE HARITAL ESTATE
During the relatively short marriage, David's parents gave
David substantial cash gifts and advances on his inheritance in
addition to loaning him $7,000.00 in connection with the purchase
of the parties1 home.
As stated in Point II of this Brief, the law is well settled
in Utah that gifted or inherited property received by a party
during a marriage should generally be returned to the party to whom
the

gift

was

made, when

that

issue was

raised

in divorce

proceedings.
The trial court in this present case failed to follow the law
in Utah as was recently set forth in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 7 60
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) where Justice Howe states:
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making
"equitable" property division pursuant to
section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with the
rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and
with the division made in many of our own
cases, generally award property acquired by one
spouse by gift and inheritance during the
marriage (or property acquired in exchanged
thereof) to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhance of its values unless
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts
or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property,
. . . or (2) the property has been consumed or
its identity lost through combining or
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has
made a gift of an interest therein to the other
25

spouse.
[Emphasis added]
Likewise, in Preston v. Preston, 646 P. 2d 705, Utah 1982
Justice Oaks again set forth the standard on gifted and inherited
property in Utah and stated that to be marital property it has to
be acquired during the marriage through the '"joint effort" of the
parties.

If there is an absence of such joint efforts, then the

property should be treated as a separate and returned to the party
who originally received it.
In this case, the testimony was clear that the $2 0,000.00 cash
used as part of the down payment on the marital residence was a
gift to David only not David and Elizabeth (Tr. 636, R. 18-21) .
Likewise, the car originally given David by his parents and
subsequently used as a trade in on the Blazer and the $13,000.00
cash gift to David from his parents was a gift to him consistent
with their family practice of giving a car to each of the children
(R. 18-21) Even Elizabeth said that this type of gift was made "to
each of their (the Wilson's) children to buy automobiles" (Tr. 52) .
Nowhere in the record is there evidence to show that these
gifts were made to both David and Elizabeth by his parents. To the
contrary, affidavits filed by David's parents during the initial
proceedings reflect neither had any intent to make any of these
gifts to anyone but David alone (R. 18-21)
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In spite of the evidence presented by David and the lack of
evidence from Elizabeth in support of her position that this was
in some way marital property the trial court arbitrarily without
credible evidence or legal authority simply characterized these
gifts as marital property and divided them equally between the
parties.

Such an approach is devoid of fairness and equity and is

simply an incorrect legal analysis of the facts and a clear
misunderstanding of the law.
A similar error in approach was committed in connection with
the handling of the $7,000.00 loan made by David's father to assist
him in buying the house (Tr. 712) . The evidence was that the total
$27,000.00 given by David's parents was made in the form of two
payments; the first, $20,000.00 which was an advance on David's
inheritance (Tr. 713) and the second, $7,000.00 which was a loan
from David's father to David (Tr. 712).

Elizabeth provided no

testimony to contradict this other than that she felt that the
total $27,000.00 was a gift to both of them (Tr. 768-769).
In spite of that evidence the trial court chose the simple but
erroneous solution that such a HBAn was unenforceable and only a
"moral" obligation (Tr. 870) .
In taking the approach it did, by "just dividing everything
down the center, totalling everything they had and dividing it down
the center" (Tr. 870) (Except for the $7,000.00 owed to David's
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father) the trial court was able to avoid having to allocate assets
between the parties, and take a relatively easy but incorrect way
out.
That portion of the Decree that gives David no credit for the
gifts he received from his parents should be vacated and the matter
remanded with instructions to the trial court to increase David's
lien in the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT
TO P A Y & 5,000 TOWARDS PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S
FEES
^
An award of attorney's fees in divorce actions in Utah is
authorized by the provisions of Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Anno,
(1953) which states in relevant part:
The court may order either party to pay to the
Clerk a sum of money to enable each party to
prosecute or defend the action
Id.
The foundational case in Utah which has interpreted and applied
that statute and upon which subsequent cases from the Utah Supreme
Court and this Court are based is the case of Kerr v. Kerr, 610
P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), in addressing the adequacy of the attorney's
fee awarded, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . pursuant to statute [footnote] A court
in a divorce proceeding is empowered to award
such sums as will permit the opposing party to
bring or defend the action. The decision to
make such an award, together with the amount
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thereof, rests primarily witinh the sound
discretion of the Court. [footnote] As with
the award of alimony, however, an award of
attorney's fees must rest on the basis of need
[footnote] and reasonableness"
In fact, under Utah law, there are three elements which must
be satisfied and proven by the party seeking an award of attorney's
fees; those are:

(1) the reasonableness of the fee; (2) the need

of the party seeking the fee award to have her fee paid or
contributed to; and (3) the ability of the party against whom the
award is made to pay or contribute towards a fee.
As was stated in Ghost v. Ghost, 26 Utah 2d 398, 490 P. 2d 339
(1971), the trial court not only had to consider the reasonableness
of the fee requested and the need of the party seeking the fee, but
also what amount the party having to pay the fee could reasonably
pay.

Id. at 340.
In this case, the first two of those elements are not being

challenged by David. With regard to the element of reasonableness,
it is undisputed that this was a lengthy, extensive and expensive
custody

trial.

Elizabeth's

attorney's

fee was approximately

$11,000.00, together with costs of over $1,379.05 (R. 161-169).
David expended attorney's fees through trial of over $11,3 03.50,
together with the costs of $3,525.00 (R. 170-174).

Both sides

presented their evidence as to fees in somewhat of an unorthodox
manner after each had rested and by way of Affidavit and without
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stipulation. However, for purposes of this appeal, the element of
reasonableness is not challenged.
The second element is the need of the person requesting the
award of fees.

In this case, it is clear that neither party has

significant income and each was attempting to meet minimum monthly
expenses as best they could. Even though Elizabeth did not testify
that she requested an award of attorney's fees, and had need of an
award and it is acknowledged by David that under the recent holding
of Mauahn v. Mauahn, 770, P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989), this court
can review the entire record and extract from it evidence which
would demonstrate the need of the requesting party without the
necessity of a specific statement being made by that party during
her testimony.

Id at 160.

However, the award of attorney's fees in this case should fail
because the third element, i.e., the ability of the party being
ordered to pay the fees was not proven.

David did not and does

not have the ability to pay that obligation.
In analyzing whether or not that element has been proven, two
questions must be asked and answered.

First, does David have

sufficient income to allow him to pay the fee?

Second, does David

have sufficient property to which he can look in order to satisfy
the fee obligation?

The answer to both of these questions in this

case is no.
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With regard to the first question, after considering the
obligations which have been imposed upon David in terms of on-going
support, his monthly net disposable income after the payment of
those obligations amounts to $584,75.

From that amount, he will

be required to pay rent on an apartment, feed, clothe and transport
himself and care for the children's needs when they are with him
under the very expanded visitation schedule awarded by the trial
court.

Simply and succinctly put, he has no discretionary income

from which to pay an award of $5,000.00 in attorney's fees for his
wife.
In analyzing the second question as to whether or not he has
property which would allow that fee to be satisfied, under the
property distribution of the court, he has none, i.e., he was
awarded a $13,500.00 lien in the marital residence, not payable
until the happening of the standard contingencies and, therefore,
non-liquid; one-half of the IRA account of $13,000 also not liquid
without

incurring

substantial

tax

penalties

for

an

early

withdrawal; and $1,000.00 equity in a Ready Asset Account (liquid).
After considering the fact that Elizabeth's disposable income
is far greater than David's

and the fact that David has no liquid

assets from which to pay a fee and the further fact that even if
those assets were liquid he would be required to invade the same,
and thereby reduce a substantial portion of the value of the
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property awarded to him and the final fact that he is obligated to
pay his own attorney, the award of attorney'^ fees in this case
was

simply

without

merit,

inequitable to David.

unjustified

and

most

unfair

and

As such, that award should be vacated and

each side should be required to bear their own fees in connection
with this action.
CONCLUSION
The trial
Elizabeth.

court erred

in awarding

permanent

alimony to

Each of the parties was approximately equal in terms

of education and earning capacity.

By making the award of alimony

it did, the trial court erroneously attempted to maintain the
wife's standard of living and by so doing, greatly reduced the
husband's standard of living.

In addition, the trial court's

Findings were fatally defective in that they did not address the
wife's

ability

to

support

herself

or

contain

financial facts to support the alimony award.

the

necessary

The alimony award

should be vacated in its entirety.
David's premarital property and the cash gifts given to David
during the marriage from his parents were entirely and erroneously
disregarded. In not returning to David his premarital property and
giving David credit for the gifts he received from his parents, the
trial court failed to follow the rule set down in Mortensen v.
Mortensen, supra

and, consequently,
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erred.

David

should be

restored his premarital property and he should be given credit for
the gifts he received from his parents by increasing his lien in
the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts.
In making its award of attorney's fees, the trial court failed
to consider the ability of David to pay those fees.

After paying

the support ordered, David's disposable income is far less than
Elizabeth's.

In addition, he was awarded no property to which he

could look to satisfy the fee.

As such, he did not have the

ability to pay the fee and the attorney's fee award should be
vacated in its entirety.
Appellant would respectfully request that the relief requested
as set forth in page 3 of this Brief be granted and that he be
awarded his costs incurred in connection with this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November 1989.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH A. WILSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

D-88-642

vs.
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,
Defendant.

This matter was tried before the Court during the week of
January 12 through the 18, 1989, and closing arguments were heard
on February 7, 1989.

The plaintiff was present at all hearings,

and represented by Judith Romney Wolbach.

The defendant was

present at all of the hearings, and represented by Lynn J. Clark.
The

Court

heard

testimony

from

the

witnesses,

admitted

documentary evidence, heard oral argument and took the matter
under advisement.

The Court being fully advised in the premises

now makes its ruling.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and defendant have three children as issue of

this marriage: Isaiah, born July 2, 1982; Rachel, born May 28,
1984; and Isaac, born June 15, 1985.
2.

Plaintiff has had custody of the children since the

filing of the divorce action, February 26, 1988.
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3.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff and the three minor children have resided in

the home acquired by the parties during their marriage.
4.

Plaintiff and defendant are both loving and caring

parents, and are genuinely interested in the welfare of their
children.
5.

Plaintiff and defendant both have a good relationship

with the children.
6.

Plaintiff

has

been

the

primary

caretaker

of

the

children since birth.
I.

Plaintiff

controlled,

more

is more
flexible

emotionally
in

her

stable, better self-

thinking

and

approaches

conflicts in a more rational manner.
8.

Plaintiff is a more forgiving and tolerant person.

9.

Defendant is stern in his approach to disciplining the

children.
10.

Defendant is a rigid, unyielding and uncompromising

individual who will not compromise on what he believes is right.
II.

Defendant is an authoritarian who sees things as only

being black and white.
12.

Defendant wanted to dominate the lives of his wife and

children.
13.

Defendant's

dominance

and

control

could

cause

children to become rebellious when they reach their teens.

the
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Defendant has created a situation where there is a

great deal of acrimony between himself and the plaintiff, and as
a result the parties should have minimum contact•
15.

The

plaintiff

is

more

likely

to

cultivate

the

children's love for their father than the father would for the
mother.
16.

Defendant is prone to demean plaintiff in the presence

of the children and minimize her role as mother and custodial
parent.
17.

Defendant

believes

in

a

very

strong,

rigorous

patriarchal role in his marriage and as a result the wife is to
be submissive and passive.
18.

The

testimony

by

the

neighbors

and

friends

about

mismatched clothing, meals, and supervision indicated that both
parents were wanting in parental skills.
19.

Defendant as well as plaintiff was responsible for the

children's appearance, meals and supervision.
20.

Plaintiff's

work

schedule

is

better

adapted

for

providing adequate day care for the children while she works.
21.

Defendant's work schedule

is such that it would be

difficult to provide stable and consistent supervision of the
children while he is at work.
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The Court concludes for the reasons above stated that it is
in the best interests of the children that they remain in the
custody of their mother•
The plaintiff exhibits more of the qualities that would
allow

the

children

potential, whereas

to

reach

their

the defendant

physical

and

emotional

is more apt to stifle the

children's potential.
The plaintiff provides a better role model for the children
inasmuch as she recognizes that there is equality between husband
and wife, mutual respect, and that neither is to be totally
dominant over the other.
The

Court

recognizes

that

the

defendant

has many

fine

attributes and will make every effort to do well by his children.
However, his inability to be forgiving, unbending and somewhat
vindictive

are

not

attributes

that

should

be

instilled

in

children in today's society.
The visitation schedule for the defendant is as follows:
1.
placing

Alternating weekends from Friday after school through
the

children

in school

the

following Monday.

Such

visitation would increase to include either the Thursday night
Friday period or the Monday, Monday night period where a three
day weekend from school is scheduled.
2.

One night each week from the time school is out until

8:00 p.m. that evening.
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including

January

1,

President's Day, Easter Sunday, Memorial Day, July 4, July 24,
Labor Day, and Veterans Day,

Such visitations to begin the

evening prior to the holiday and continue through the holiday
until 8:00 p.m., except for the 4th and 24th of July on which
occasions the children should spend the night with defendant and
be returned home the next morning by 10:00 a.m.
4.

Father's Day, defendant's birthday, six hours on each

of the children's birthdays.
5.

Alternating Thanksgivings beginning Wednesday evening

at 6:00 p.m. and continuing through Sunday evening at 7:00 p.m.
6.

Alternating Christmas vacations wherein the children

will spend Christmas Eve and until noon Christmas Day with one
parent and the remainder of Christmas Day and the following five
days with the other parent.

Such arrangement to alternate on a

year by year basis.
7.

Forty-five days of the summer vacation to begin no

sooner than one week after school is out and to end no later than
two weeks prior to school resuming.
If either parent moves from the state of Utah, the noncustodial parent should have the following visitation rights:
1.

Christmas Day and up to two weeks of holiday vacation

from school, every other year.

During alternate years, after

Christmas Day, until the children's school recess ends.
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Forty-five days each summer.

This visitation would

preferably begin between one week after school is out and two
weeks before school begins in the fall.
3.

The

Thanksgiving

holiday,

from

Wednesday

through

Sunday.
4.

During the spring break or Easter holiday, to the

extent that this does not interfere with the children's school.
5.

Other visitation where the children live, as agreed to

by the parties.
As per stipulation of the parties, the grandparents of the
children shall have reasonable telephone access to the children,
and the following visitation rights, regardless of where the
parents reside:
1.

The paternal grandparents shall have the right to visit

with the children one week each summer, or during a school
recess.
2.

The maternal grandparents shall have the right to visit

with the children one week each summer.
3.

The visitation with the respective grandparents shall

be scheduled by March 1 of each year.
Either party can petition the Court to review the visitation
schedule when either party moves from the state of Utah.
The plaintiff is awarded the following • real and personal
property:
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The home located at 5496 Hews Place, Salt Lake City,

Utah, subject to a lien in the sum of $13,900.00 in favor of the
Defendant.

The

plaintiff

shall

pay

the

$13,900.00

to

the

defendant within 60 days after the occurrence of any one of the
following events:
(a)

The

plaintiff

remarries

or

cohabits

with

the

member of the opposite sex.
(b)

When the youngest child reaches its majority.

(c)

If

the plaintiff

moves

and

establishes

another

place of residence.
2.

One-half of the retirement account and one-half of the

ready assets account.
3.

The sofa, high back chair and computer provided she pay

defendant $600.00 for the computer.
4.

All other property as per stipulation.

The defendant is awarded the following personal property:
1.

The Blazer subject to paying plaintiff $6,500.00 upon

transferring the vehicle to defendant.
2.

The Ford pickup.

3.

One-half of the retirement account and one-half of the

ready asset account.
4.

The sewing machine.

5.

All other property as per stipulation.
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The defendant shall pay child support in accordance with the
child support guidelines.
The plaintiff shall be awarded the divorce.
The defendant shall pay $250.00 as alimony to plaintiff.
The defendant

shall pay

$5,000.00 to plaintiff

for the

attorney's fees and costs incurred by her.
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

of

Law,

and

Decree

in

conformance

with

Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

&

day of March, 1989.

A.

( - 7 ) , •f-'fVL'-c4*C>
.JOHW A. ROKICH
PRICT COURT JUDGE

this
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
£3

Decision,

postage

day of March, 1989:

Judith Romney Wolbach
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 W. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Lynn J, Clark
Attorney for Defendant
948 E. North Union Avenue, Suite 105
Midvale, Utah 84047

prepaid,

to

the

JUDITH ROiyiNEY WOLBACH (3534)
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6222

APR 2 6 1989
By
Lc'Huiy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH A. WILSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

vs.
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,

.

Defendant.

Civil No. D-88-642
Judge John A. Rokich

This matter was tried before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable
John A. Rokich, District Court Judge, presiding, during the week of January 12
through 11, 1989.

Both parties were present throughout the trial.

The

parties were represented by their attorneys of record, Judith Rcmney Wolbach
for the plaintiff, and Lynn J Clark for the defendant. During the course of
the trial, witnesses testified, including both parties, other lay witnesses,
and Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and Dr. Victor Cline. The Court received documents
in evidence, including a custody evaluation prepared by Dr. Stewart pursuant
to a court order, and a report written by Dr. Cline at the defendant's
request. In addition, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the Court viewed
video tapes prepared by Dr. Cline. The trial was continued until February 7,
1989, at which time the Court heard the final arguments of counsel. The Court
then took the matter under advisement, requesting counsel for the plaintiff to
submit an affidavit on plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, together with

information on any employment secured by the plaintiff after trial. The Court
also requested counsel for the defendant to provide additional information on
the

defendant's

medical

insurance.

The

Court

thereafter received the

information requested, and also received additional information volunteered by
defendant's

counsel

regarding the defendant's ability to earn additional

income. The Court took the matter under advisement and prepared a Memorandum
Decision, dated March 6, 1989.
defendant's

On April 18, 1989, a hearing was had on

Request for Clarification of Minute Entry, Objections to Proposed

Findings, Conclusions and Decree, and Motion to Reconsider Judgment and on the
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Proposed Findings and Conclusions, during
which hearing counsel for the plaintiff was directed to make certain changes
in the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.
Counsel for the

plaintiff having made said corrections, the Court, having

been fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
had been such a resident for more than three months inmediately prior to
commencement of this action.
2. The parties are husband and wife, having married on June 27, 1981,
in Jackson, State of Mississippi.
3. The parties have irreconcilable differences which make continuation
of their marriage impossible.
4. Three children have been born to the parties as issue of their
marriage: Isaiah Wilson, born July 2, 1982; Rachel Wilson, born May 28, 1984;
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and Isaac Wilson, born June 15, 1985.
5. The plaintiff has had custody of these minor children since the
filing of the divorce action, February 26, 1988.
6. The plaintiff and the three minor children have been residing in the
home acquired by the parties during their marriage, a house and lot located at
5496 South Hews Place, Kearns, Utah 84118.
7. The custody of these children has been in issue throughout the
pendency of this action.
8. Both parties are loving and caring parents, are genuinely interested
in the welfare of their children, and have good relationships with the
children.
9. This Court finds that custody of the parties children should be
awarded to the plaintiff for the following reasons and supporting facts:
(a) The plaintiff has been the primary caretaker of the children since
their births.
(b) The plaintiff is more emotionally stable, better self-controlled,
more flexible in her thinking, and approaches conflicts in a more rational
manner than the defendant.
(c) The plaintiff is a more forgiving and tolerant person than the
defendant.
(d) The

defendant

is

stern

in his approach to disciplining the

children.
(e)

The

defendant

is

a

rigid,

unyielding,

and

uncompromising

individual, who will not compromise on what he believes is right.
(f) The defendant is an authoritarian, who sees things as only being
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black and white.
(g) The defendant has wanted to dominate the lives of the plaintiff and
the children.
(h) The defendant's expression of his need for dominance and control
could cause the children to become rebellious when they reach their teens.
(i) Hie acrimony existing between the parties requires that they have
minimal contact with one another.
(j) The plaintiff is more likely to cultivate the children's love for
their father, the defendant, than he would for their mother, the plaintiff.
(k) The defendant is prone to demean the plaintiff in the presence of
the children and to minimize her role as mother and (custodial parent.
(1) The defendant believes in a very strong, rigorous patriarchial role
for the husband

in a marriage, and he believes that a wife should be

submissive and passive.
(m) The

testimony

by

the neighbors and friends about mismatched

clothing, meals, and supervision indicated that both parents were wanting in
parental skills.
(n) Both parties were responsible for the children's appearance, meals,
and supervision.
(o) Upon Dr. Elizabeth's suggestion, the plaintiff took a parenting
class during the pendency of this action, and upgraded her parenting skills.
(p) The plaintiff's work schedule is better adapted than that of the
defendant for providing adequate day care for the children.
(q) Hie defendant's work schedule is such that it would be difficult to
provide stable and consistent supervision of the children while he is at work.
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10. This Court finds, for the reasons above stated:
(a) That it is in the best interests of the children of the parties
that they remain in the custody of their mother/ the plaintiff;
(b) That the plaintiff exhibits more of the qualities that would allow
the children to reach their physical and emotional potential, whereas the
defendant is more apt to stifle the children's potential;
(c) That the plaintiff provides a better role model for the children
than does the defendant, because she recognizes that there is equality between
husband and wife, that there should be mutual respect/ and that neither is to
be totally dominant over the other; and/
(d) That although the defendant has many fine attributes and will make
every effort to do well by his children/ his inability to be forgiving/ and
his unbending and somewhat vindictive traits / are not attributes that should
be instilled in children in today's society.
11. It is fair and reasonable that the defendant should be awarded
visitation as follows:
(a) Every other weekend/ from Friday after school until Monday morning
in time for the children's school. The children should be picked up and
returned to their school or day care facility by the defendant. This weekend
visitation would increase to include either the Thursday night-Friday period
or the Monday-Monday night period where a three-day weekend holiday from
school is scheduled;
(b) CXie night each week, as agreed to by the parties, from the time
school is out until 8:00 p.m.;
(c) Alternating major holidays, including January 1, President's Day,
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Easter Sunday, Memorial Day, July 4, July 24, Labor Day and Veterans Day. Such
visitation shall begin the evening prior to the holiday and shall continue
through the holiday until 8;00 p.m., except for July 4 and July 24, on which
occasions the children should remain with the defendant through the night of
the holiday, to be taken to their school the next morning;
(d) Fathers' Day, defendant's birthday, and six hours on the children's
birthdays;
(e)

Alternating

Thanksgivings,

beginning

Wednesday

evening

and

continuing through Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m.;
(f) Alternating Christmas vacations wherein the children will spend
Christmas Eve until

Christmas Day at noon with one parent and the remainder

of Christmas Day and the following five days with the other parent. This
arrangement will alternate on a year-by-year basis; and,
(g) Forty-five days of the sumner vacation, to begin no sooner than one
week after school is out and to end no later than two weeks prior to school
resuming.
12. If either parent moves from the State of Utah, it is fair and
reasonable that the defendant should have the following visitation:
(a) Christmas Day and up to twD weeks of the holiday recess from
school, every other year, and in alternating years, frcm the day after
Christmas until the end of the children's school recess;
(b) Forty-five days each summer, preferably to begin one week after
school is out and two weeks before school begins in the autumn;
(c) The Thanksgiving holiday, from Wednesday thrpough Sunday;
(d) Additional visitation during the spring break or Easter recess, to
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the extent that this does not interfere with the children's school.
(e) Additional visitation in the city where the children are residing
with the plaintiff/ as agreed to by the parties.
13. The parties have stipulated/

and it is reasonable/ that the

grandparents should have visitation with the children/ as follows:
(a) By both the paternal and the maternal grandparents/ reasonable
telephone access to the children;
(b) By the paternal grandparents/ one week each sunmer, or during a
school recess; and/
(c) By the maternal grandparents, one week each summer/ or during a
school recess.
14. Visitation by grandparents should be arranged by March 1 each year.
It is in the children's best interests that visitation by the defendant or by
grandparents should not be allowed to interfere with the children's school.
15. It is reasonable that either party may petition the Court to review
the visitation schedule when either party moves from the State of Utah.
16. Hie defendant is employed as a bus driver for Granite School
District and as a part-time chaplain for the Utah State Prison. The defendant
receives an annual director's fee of $2/000.00 from Wilson Land Development
Co., a business founded by his father. His gross monthly income from these
three sources is $1/747.00.
17.
marriage.

The

plaintiff

was

not

employed outside the heme during the

The plaintiff was not employed outside the hone at the time of the

divorce. She obtained enployment as a receptionist prior to the ruling entered
herein. She is now earning $960.00 a month, gross.
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18. During the time the parties moved to the State of Utah until their
separation/ they received/ in the form of contributions to the church they
held in their home/ $150.00 a month from the defendant's parents and $350.00 a
month from the plaintiff's parents.
19. The defendant's cost for the medical insurance he is providing for
the children is $54.00 a month.
20. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines now in effect/ the
defendant's child support obligation is $354.00 a month.
21. The children are enrolled full-time in a Montessori School. This
Court finds that it is in the best interests of the children to continue in
this program, on the basis of the testimony and written reports of both Dr.
Stewart and Dr. Cline# showing their need for a structured environment.
22. The present cost of the children's day care only (exclusive of
tuition) is $325.00.
23. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines now in effect/ the
defendant's share of the cost of day care is $211.25 a month.
24 o The defendant has Blue Cross/Blue Shield family insurance through
his employment with Granite School District. The additional cost for coverage
for the children is $54.00 a month/ as above indicated.

It is reasonable that

he should be ordered to continue to provide this insurance for the children.
It is also reasonable that each party should bear half of all medical/ dental,
orthodontic/ and eye-care expenses that are not covered by insurance.
25o The defendant has no insurance on his life at present.
26. Based on the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their
marriage/ the incomes of the parties/ the needs of the plaintiff, and the
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defendant's ability to pay, it is reasonable, just/ and equitable that the
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $250.00 a month.
Said alimony shall terminate upon the plaintiff's remarriage/ cohabitation
with a member of the opposite sex, or death.
27. It is reasonable that all payments by the defendant for child
support/ day care, and alimony be paid in two equal installments on the 5th
and 20th day of each month/ carmencing April 1/ 1989.
28. If the defendant is thirty days or more in arrears in his total
child support and alimony obligation for one month/ a Withhold and Deliver
Order may be issued.
29. The marital estate of the parties consists of the following:
(a) The parties' marital residence, a house and lot situated at 5496
South/ Reams, Utah 84118/ with an equity of $28/800.00;
(b) A 1987 Blazer, presently operated by the plaintiff, with a value of
$13/000.00;
(c) A 1979 pickup truck/ presently operated by the defendant, with a
value of $1,000.00;
(d) Household furniture with a nominal value;
(e) A computer, which was given to the plaintiff by the defendant after
the parties' separation;
(f) Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account #56623210/ the balance of which,
according to the defendant's Financial Declaration was $1,994.59 on Septennber
7, 1989, and the present value of which is unknown;
(g) Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account #566-46206, the balance of which,
according to the defendant's Financial Declaration was $13,945.00 on January
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1/ 1988/ and the present value of which is unknown; and/
(h) A deferred income account with Granite School District/ into which
the defendant has made payments of $12.55 a month for approximately one year.
30. The marital residence

was purchased in December of 1985 and title

thereto was put in the names of both parties. The parties received a gift of
$20/000.00 from the defendant's parents for the purchase of this property. In
addition/ the defendant's parents loaned $7/000.00/ with no interest and with
no required payments thereon/ to the defendant to assist in purchasing this
property. This loan is not secured and is not evidenced in writing and is not
enforceable against the parties.
31. The balance due on the house and lot is $26/161.00. The fair market
value/ as stipulated to by the parties is $54/850.00. The monthly payments are
$354.00. The equity of the parties is $28/800.00.
32. The parties stipulated/ during the trial/ that the party who was
awarded custody of the children would be awarded this property. This Court
approves that stipulation and finds that it is just and equitable that the
house and lot be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to her assuming and paying
the first mortgage thereon; that the defendant quit-claim his interest therein
to the plaintiff; and that the defendant be awarded an equitable lien on said
property in the amount of $13/900.00/ representing his share of the equity
reduced by half of the estimated costs of sale.
33. It is reasonable that the plaintiff should be required to pay the
defendant's $13/900.00 lien within 60 days after the occurence of any one of
the following:
(a) The plaintiff remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite
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sex;
(b) The youngest child reaches his majority; or,
(c) The plaintiff moves and establishes another place of residence.
34. The parties own a 1987 Blazer subject to a balance thereon of
approximately $4,000.00. The monthly payments are $97.00 a month, which have
been paid by the plaintiff since the separation of the parties. The parties
traded in a truck, used funds from their Ready Asset account, and applied a
cash gift from defendant's parents for the down payment on this vehicle.
35. It is reasonable, just, and equitable that the 1987 Blazer be
awarded to the defendant and that he pay to the plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00
for her interest therein and to enable her to purchase an automobile for her
own use. This payment shall be made to the plaintiff when she turns over the
Blazer to the defendant.
36. It is reasonable, just, and equitable that the truck be awarded to
the defendant and that he pay to the plaintiff the sum of $500.00 for her
interest therein.
37. Shortly before the parties1 marriage, the defendant sold real
property which he had previously received as a gift from his parties and
deposited the proceeds of sale,

$37,500.00, in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset

Account.
38. The parties received a wedding gift from the defendant's parents in
the amount of $8,000.00. From this sum, tithing was paid in the amount of
$5,000.00 for gifts received from defendant's parents (including that referred
to in the preceding paragraph), and deposited the remainder in the Merrill
Lynch Ready Asset Account. As described
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in this paragraph, the gift of

$37/500.00 and the wedding gift of $8/000.00 were ccniingled.
39. The parties used funds from said account to meet their living
expenses.

In addition/

$10/000.00

was withdrawn

from

said

account and

deposited in a Merrill Lynch I.R.A. account/ the parties1 only retirenent
account.
40. In order to determine the value the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset
Account and the Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account as of the date the Decree of
Divorce

is entered/

documentary

it will be necessary for the defendant to produce

verification of said values as of the date of entry. Said

documentation should be provided to counsel for the plaintiff within 30 days
of the date of entry of the Decree.
41. The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account and the Merrill Lynch I.R.A.
accounts are both marital assets and it is reasonable/ just and equitable that
their value should be divided equally between the parties. The defendant
should be awarded both of these accounts and he should be ordered to pay to
the plaintiff/ as her share of said accounts, half of the value of said
accounts as shown on the books of Merrill Lynch as of the date of entry of the
Decree of Divorce/ for which sum the plaintiff should be given judgment.
42. It is reasonable, just and equitable that the defendant should be
awarded his deferred

interest account with the Granite School District,

subject to no claim by the plaintiff.
43. The parties have entered
herein,

for the division

of most

into a written stipulation, on file
of

their

furniture, furnishings and

appliances. It is reasonable, just and equitable that said property should be
awarded pursuant to said stipulation.
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44. With regard to the items on which the parties could not agree, it
is reasonable^ just and equitable that the plaintiff should be awarded the
sofa-bed/ the two high-back chairs and the computer, subject to her paying
$600.00 to the defendant for his share in the latter; and it is reasonable,
just and equitable that the defendant should be awarded the sewing machine.
45. The attorney's fees
excess of $10,000.00.

incurred by the plaintiff herein were in

This Court finds that said attorney's fees were

necessary and reasonable, but having taken into account the distribution of
property herein, together with the fact that the plaintiff is now employed,
determines that she should be given judgment for only $5,000.00 toward her
legal expenses, which the defendant should be ordered to pay.
46. Except as otherwise indicated herein, the parties have no marital
debts. It is reasonable, just and equitable that each party should be ordered
to pay all debts incurred by said party since the separation of the parties,
except as otherwise herein indicated.
47. It is reasonable, just and equitable that the parties should be
ordered to execute and deliver all documents required to effect the Decree of
Divorce.
NOW, THEREFORE/ having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact/
the Court makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject
matter of/ this action.
2. The plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce, on the grounds
of mental cruelty.
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3. It is in the children's best interests that their custody be awarded
to the plaintiff*
4. The defendant's obligations to pay child support and a share of the
children's day care should be calculated on the basis of the Child Support
Schedule in effect at the time of the trial of this action.
5. The plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony.
6. All properties acquired during the marriage of the parties comprise
the marital estate.
7. The division of marital property set forth in the preceding Findings
of Fact allocates said property in the manner which best meets the needs of
the parties, which permits them to pursue their separate lives, and which is
in the best interests of the minor children of the parties.
8. The $7/000.00 loan from the defendant's parents is unenforceable,
and it would be inequitable to encumber the plaintiff's share of the marital
estate with said loan or any part thereof.
9. The Decree of Divorce should be in conformance with the foregoing
Findings of Fact.
DATED this d? £

day of April, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
district Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this (p

day of April, 1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,

a correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to
Lynn J Clark, Attorney at Law, 948 East North Union Boulevard, Suite C-105,
Midvale, Utah 84047.
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JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH (3534)
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6222

Utyvty Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

.

ELIZABETH A. WILSON,

Ql'^^HS

H-sn-^-sasa^

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,

vs.
:

DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,
Defendant.

Civil No. D-88-642
Judge John A. Rokich

This matter was tried before the above-entitled Court/ the Honorable
John A. Rokich, District Court Judge/ presidingf during the week of January 12
through 11, 1989.

Both parties were present throughout the trial.

The

parties were represented by their attorneys of record/ Judith Rocnney Vfolbach
for the plaintiff/ and Lynn J Clark for the defendant. During the course of
the trial/ witnesses testified/ including both parties, other lay witnesses/
and Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and Dr. Victor Cline. The Court received documents
in evidence, including a custody evaluation prepared by Dr. Stewart pursuant
to a court order/ and a report written by Dr. Cline at the defendant's
request. In addition, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the Court viewed
video tapes prepared by Dr. Cline. The trial was continued until February 1,
1989/ at which time the Court heard the final arguments of counsel. The Court
then took the matter under advisement/ requesting counsel for the plaintiff to

submit an affidavit on plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, together with
information on any employment secured by the plaintiff after trial. The Court
also requested counsel for the defendant to provide additional information on
the

defendant's

medical

insurance.

The Court thereafter received the

information requested/ and also received additional information volunteered by
defendant's

counsel

regarding the defendant's ability to earn additional

income. The Court took the matter under advisement and prepared a Memorandum
Decision/ dated March 6, 1989.

On April 18/ 1989, a hearing was had on

defendant's Request for Clarification of Minute Entry/ Objections to Proposed
Findings/ Conclusions and Decree and Motion to Reconsider Judgment/ and on the
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Proposed Findings and Conclusions, during
which hearing counsel for the plaintiff was directed to make certain changes
in the proposed Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.
Counsel for the plaintiff having made said corrections/ and the Court having
made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, upon motion of
counsel for the plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED/ DECREED/ AND ORDERED:
1. The plaintiff is granted a divorce, terminating the marriage of the
parties, to become final and absolute upon entry by the Clerk of the Court.
2. The plaintiff is awarded care, custody, and control of the parties'
minor children, Isaiah, Rachel, and Isaac.
3. The defendant is awarded visitation as follows:
(a) Every other weekend, from Friday after school until Monday morning
in time for the children's school. The children shall be picked up and
returned to their school or day care facility by the defendant. This weekend
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visitation shall increase to include either the Thursday night-Friday period
or the Monday-Monday night period where a three-day weekend holiday frcm
school is scheduled;
(b) One night each week, as agreed to by the parties, from the time
school is out until 8:00 p.m.;
(c) Alternating major holidays, including January 1, President's Day,
Easter Sunday, Manorial Day, July 4, July 24, Labor Day and Veterans Day. Such
visitation shall begin the evening prior to the holiday and shall continue
through the holiday until 8:00 p.m., except for July 4 and July 24, on which
occasions the children will remain with the defendant through the night of the
holiday, to be taken to their school by him the next morning;
(d) Fathers' Day, defendant's birthday, and six hours on the children's
birthdays;
(e)

Alternating

Thanksgivings,

beginning

Wednesday

evening

and

continuing through Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m.;
(f) Alternating Christmas vacations wherein the children will spend
Christmas Eve until

Christmas Day at noon with one parent, and the remainder

of Christmas Day and the following five days with the other parent. This
arrangement will alternate on a year-by-year basis; and,
(g) Forty-five days of the sunmer vacation, to begin no sooner than one
week after school is out and to end no later than two weeks prior to school
resuming.
4. If either parent moves from the State of Utah, the defendant shall
have the following visitation:
(a) Christmas Day and up to two weeks of the holiday recess frcm
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school, every other year, and in alternating years, from the day after
Christmas until the end of the children's school recess;
(b) Forty-five days each sunnier, preferably to begin one week after
school is out and ending no later than

two weeks before school begins in the

autumn;
(c) The Thanksgiving holiday, from Wednesday through Sunday;
(d) Additional visitation during the spring break or Easter recess, to
the extent that this does not interfere with the children's school.
(e) Additional visitation in the city where the children are residing
with the plaintiff, as agreed to by the parties.
5. The paternal and the maternal grandparents shall have visitation
with the children, as follows:
(a) By both the paternal and the maternal grandparents, reasonable
telephone access to the children;
(b) By the paternal grandparents, one week each sumner, or during a
school recess; and,
(c) By the maternal grandparents, one week each summer, or during a
school recess.
6. Visitation by grandparents shall be arranged by March 1 each year.
Visitation by the defendant or by grandparents shall not be allowed to
interfere with the children's school.
7. Either party may petition the Court to review the visitation
schedule when either party moves from the State of Utah.
8. The defendant is ordered to pay child support in the amount of
$354.00 a month.
-4-

9. The defendant is ordered to pay $211.25 a month to the plaintiff as
his share of the day-care expense for the children.
10. The defendant is ordered to continue to provide Blue Cross/Blue
Shield insurance coverage for the children through his employment. Each party
is ordered to pay half of all medical/ dental/ orthodontic/ and eye-care
expenses that are not covered by insurance.
11. The defendant is ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $250.00 a
month.

Said

alimony

shall

terminate

upon

the

plaintiff's

remarriage/

cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, or death.
12.

All payments by the defendant for child support/ day caref and

alimony shall be paid in two equal installments on the 5th and 20th day of
each month/ axtmencing April 1/ 1989.
13. If the defendant is thirty days or more in arrears in an amount
equal to his total child support and alimony obligation for one month/ a
Withhold and Deliver Order may be issued.
14. Hie house and lot situated at 5496 Hews Place/ Kearns/ Utah 84118/
more particularly described as
Lot 51/ HEW-WOOD ESTATES/ No. 2, County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, according
to the official plat thereof
is awarded to the plaintiff/ subject to her assuming and paying the first
mortgage thereon, and the defendant is ordered to quit-claim his interest
therein to the plaintiff.
15. The defendant is awarded an equitable lien on said property in the
amount of $13/900.00/ payable within 60 days after the occurence of any one of
the following:
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(a) The plaintiff remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite
sex;
(b) The youngest child reaches his majority; or,
(c) Hie plaintiff moves and establishes another place of residence.
16. The 1987 Blazer is awarded to the defendant, subject to the
obligation thereon, holding the plaintiff harmless therefor; and he is ordered
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 for her interest therein, and to
enable her to purchase an automobile, when she turns over the Blazer to him.
17. The truck is awarded to the defendant and he is ordered to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of $500.00 for her interest therein, for which sum she
is given judgment.
18.

The

defendant

is

awarded

Merrill

Lynch

Ready

Asset Account

#56623210 and Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account #566-46206, and the plaintiff is
given judgment for one half of the total value of these two accounts as of the
date of this Decree.
19. The defendant is ordered to provide to plaintiff's counsel, within
thirty days of the date of this Decree, statements or other sufficient
validation from Merrill Lynch establishing the value of the above-described
accounts as of the date of this Decree.
20. The defendant is awarded his deferred income account with the
Granite School District, subject to no claim by the plaintiff.
21. Except as otherwise set forth herein, the furniture, furnishings,
and appliances of the parties are awarded pursuant to their stipulation, on
file herein.
22. The plaintiff is awarded the sofa-bed, the two high-back chairs and
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the computer, subject to her paying $600.00 to the defendant for his share in
the latter; and

the defendant is awarded the sewing machine.

23. The plaintiff is given judgment for $5,000.00 toward her attorney's
fees, which the defendant is ordered to pay.
24. Each party is ordered to pay all debts incurred by said party since
the separation of the parties, except as otherwise herein indicated.
25. The parties are ordered to execute arid deliver all documents
required to effect the provisions set forth herein.
DATED this

rfib

day of April, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

iLTS

ILE JOHN A. ROKICH
let Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this

day of April, 1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,

a correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to Lynn J Clark, Attorney at
Law, 948 East North Union Boulevard, Suite C-105, Midvale, Utah 84047.

